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This paper reviews distinct critical writings on the current global economic crisis in 
order to suggest that the crisis represents a distinctly new form of actor-network 
capitalism, originating in the hybrid financial innovations since the 1970s, the 
explosive growth in cyber-space potential during the 1990s and the subsuming of 
the State by finance that accompanied these two processes. The paper proposes 
the evolution of what is referred to as ultracapital (capital beyond capital) from 
within the global financial services sector, as a relational space in which to examine 
actants, networks and processes. Hybrid cyber-, juridical and socio-political spaces 
are considered in outline alongside the increasingly sophisticated development of 
new financial services instruments driven by IT innovation toward the fundamental 
detachment of value from price. These considerations suggest that many of the 
partial views on the economic crisis within the disciplines of geography, economics 
and politics need to be re-thought using cross-disciplinary, holistic analyses that 
utilize relational and actor-network theorization. Finally, the paper suggests that 
global economic events since 2007 are not just another episode in a series of 
crises which are endemic to capitalism, but a transitional phase towards an entirely 
different capitalist topology. 
I. Introduction
Each new phase of the global economic crisis that began in 2007 has revealed 
increasingly complex minutiae about the geography of global financial services 
connectivity, the role that interconnectivity plays in the production and re-production 
of capital and indeed about the nature of capital itself. Successive events have 
made startling revelations, not just about the immensely complex relational 
spaces of 21st century globalizing capitalism, but how capital is evolving. Many 
interpretations of the crisis (hereinafter GEC) however, whether Marxian or coming 
from a more neoclassical orthodoxy (see Harvey 2010; Wallerstein 2009; DeLong 
2009 for examples), show a remarkable consistency of approach in perceiving the 
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crisis (even though from very different political economy perspectives) as obeying 
certain pre-ordained rules of capitalism.
The GEC to date therefore has been continuously explicated within a determinate 
capitalism; the various academic disciplines that have examined aspects of the 
events since 2007 set up critiques which on the whole are functionalist (critiques 
of regulation and budgetary control, complex derivatives, effective capital ratios, 
changes in or new laws, differential power structures in democracy, effects of capital 
flows), institutionalist (the role of the banks, governments, ECB) or a mixture. This 
paper proposes that there is an alternative translation of the critical development 
of globalizing capitalism through actor-networks since the end of the last World 
War in particular, for which those events described by official discourses regard as 
crises are really no more than punctuation. Through the proposal of an analytical 
vehicle referred to as ultracapital, it is suggested that the real crises in globalizing 
capitalism from the end of the 20th century lie in the evolutionary spaces and flows 
of capitalism as a complex system and that these are crises constituted by the 
interstitial contractions and expansions of capitalism as a complex bionic system, 
for which actor-network theory can provide some useful revelations.
Speculation about a post-capitalist society is nothing new, from Castells’ 
network society (2000) to Netocracy (Bard & Söderqvist 2002) and Suarez-Villa’s 
Technocapitalism (2009; 2012). The suggestion of ultracapital takes a different 
approach to this growing body of conceptualization by focusing on changes in 
the meaning, measurement and use of capital itself, by looking at capitalism as a 
complex evolving actor-network system and through understanding capital as an 
expression of power (re Bichler & Nitzan 2012). Outside speculative analyses of 
the future of capitalism or post-capitalism, furthermore, there has been a tendency 
in both official and academic writings on the set of events since 2007 to take them 
at face value as ‘crises’, without looking beyond at their systemic, evolutionary 
implications. Where evolutionary processes are mentioned, they are rarely 
perceived as having dynamic complexity of their own and the role of cyberspace 
in particular is frequently merely functional, acting as a conduit for capital or as 
the origin of different forms of capital which nonetheless conform to pre-existing 
rules of capital production. The truly global scale of state bail-out packages and 
economic downturns, the threat to the dollar and the European monetary system, 
the collapse of property and housing bubbles around the world and massive losses 
in productivity and employment notwithstanding, “there is, therefore, nothing 
unprecedented, apart from its size and scope, about the current collapse” (Harvey 
2010, 10). 
Opposing views on the nature of capitalism are rooted in their different 
suppositions as to the essence of capital itself – in the case of Marxists and neo-
Marxists that capital is determined by some understanding of the value of labour 
and labour time, and in the case of the neoclassical school that capital is related 
to its’ utility, or ‘utils’, through the satisfaction of which profit is related to a social 
return on capital. There is however a critical school of thought on the nature of 
Cloke
101
capital, beginning with Marx himself (1887, 947–8), in which (Shaikh 1990, 73) 
‘capital is not a thing, but rather a definite set of social relations’. In particular, in 
detaching capital from abstract concepts such as utility and labour value which are 
in any event impossible to quantify, it becomes possible to understand capital as 
the ‘symbolic quantification of power’ (Bichler and Nitzan 2012, 65). Following this 
school of thought, this paper proposes a different analytical path to evaluate the 
GEC.
This paper seeks to explore the liminal boundaries between these different 
schools of thought on the GEC and the relevance of this set of events and processes 
to triangulating power, capital and spatio-temporal tension, to explore spaces of 
commonality and dissonance and what may lie beyond. It is proposed that the 
GEC has revealed fundamental changes, not just in the spatiality of global financial 
services interrelationships and flows of finance but in the nature of capital itself, 
involving new forms of network capitalization enabled by the interaction between the 
limitless relational space provided by information and communications technologies 
(ICT) on the one hand, and the capitalization of turbulence and flow empowered by 
temporal micro-distanciation on the other. In the former case, a carbon bond can 
be given a price unrelated to the location, ownership, use or value of atmospheric 
carbon and be securitized into a pool of similar bonds using proprietary algorithmic 
programmes to create a further income stream with no relationship at all to 
the ability to possess carbon; in the latter case, one minute of High Frequency 
Trading (HFT) through ICT-dependent programmes and exchanges can generate 
substantial profits through taking advantage of turbulence too fast to be monitored 
by humans, turbulence generated substantially by other HFT trading programmes 
and related only to share movement, not prices, values or commodities.  
These new forms of capital, referred to as ultracapital, are highly reflective of 
the power geometry and the networks that shape them – they are privileged and 
exclusionary forms of capital, from the ways in which innovative financial services 
technologies have blended into relational spaces created by their connections to 
political, social and cultural networks and processes, ‘a ‘defining’ element that 
has added a whole new realm to the logic of capital accumulation and expansion 
(Hassan 2011, 394).’ Such relational spaces include the globally important ‘dark 
pools’, anonymous, officially unregulated and highly-exclusionary trading platforms 
in which the identities of buyers and sellers are unknown to each other and which 
depend on sophisticated ‘toxicity measurement framework’1 programmes to 
analyse trading patterns in order to function. 
In challenging an emerging array of partial analyses of the GEC, the paper 
begins with a discussion on the nature of capital and its relationship to power 
and space. It briefly reviews some of the critical processes in the evolution of the 
global financial services sector, outlining the part they played in developing the 
1 See for example Dark pool trading in Asia increases – as does regulatory interest. Asia Risk, 8 
June 2012.
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characteristics of ultracapital discussed above and the value of actor-network theory 
in illuminating the analysis. The succeeding sections deal in turn with overlapping, 
critical areas of support towards the development of ultracapital; the development 
of the ‘shadow banking’ meme, the use of IT innovation to develop radically new 
cyber-spaces for the development of new kinds of capital and the development of 
offshore financial centres from ‘mere’ money-laundering regimes into cyber-portals 
for the further development and legitimation of new hybrid forms of capital; and 
lastly the processes of imagining capital that is immeasurable, producing value that 
is at once overwhelming and meaningless. The concluding section draws these 
threads together in a speculative segment focused on future possibilities.
II. Considering Capital, Space and Power
A concept at the core of how 21st century humanity perceives itself, capital has 
been problematic since Marx first gave it a fluid, uncertain place at the centre of 
his theoretical framework as an “historically specific form of social relations” (1981, 
953). Efforts to relate capital to specific quantifications of utility or labour in an 
attempt to value it in a measurable fashion fail because value is nothing more than 
“a social relation in relational time-space” (Harvey 2006, xx) – complex derivatives 
exemplify this quandary, valued as they are through social relations of circulation: 
It is therefore impossible for capital to be produced by circulation, and it is equally 
impossible for it to originate apart from circulation. It must have its origin both in 
circulation and yet not in circulation (Marx 1887, 163). 
But problems of definition, origin and consequent quantification themselves 
derive from essentially ideological efforts to theorize the value of capital by 
‘embodying a notion of capital as a “factor of production” cast in a “production 
function”’ (Harper & Endres 2010, 30); they have been efforts to fix an essential 
understanding of capital to determinate visions of capitalism with the aim of 
establishing a capitalist nomos, a social construct derived from some primordial 
capitalism for the purposes of establishing fundamental laws. 
Events since 2007 however have shown that capitalism is a fluctuating 
dependence on speed and mobility bounded by space and time (Hassan 2011, 
388) which brings into play fluid, changeable understandings of space itself, to set 
alongside those of capital. Harvey (2001) famously articulated the importance of 
the ‘spatial fix’ by which capital continually creates, destroys and reproduces new 
spaces to drive accumulation (as one instance) and yet underpinned this fix with 
a restricted view of its core ‘geographical expansion’ based on physical forms of 
capital that fail to recognise cyberspace as a dominant and increasingly important 
area of the geography of capital. Other writers (Choonera 2009; Hassan 2011) 
see financial cyberspace as the newest form of the spatial fix itself, providing 
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limitless space and mobility for the development of what this analysis describes as 
ultracapital.
Cyber-space since the mid-1990s has become far more than just an agent 
of change, a vehicle for other economic sectors or a multi-scalar conduit for the 
passage of goods and services (see Harvey 2010, 190). Its dynamic agency has 
rapidly forced the reconstruction of old geographical space whilst creating radically 
new info-spaces, themselves agents involved in reconfiguring the meaning of 
capital (Graham 2002). Capital mobility has been speeded up and through the 
potential for accumulation in HFT (‘flash-trading’) and proprietary algorithmic 
trading programmes keyed into share movements (the temporal micro-distanciation 
mentioned in the introduction) a share-price movement can be converted by 
anonymised proprietary algorithmic trading programs moving through unregulated 
and secretive dark pools to make substantial profits; at the same time exclusionary, 
restricted cyber-spaces increase profitability through secrecy from tax jurisdictions, 
anonymity and asymmetric information (Iwaisako 2010, 348).
The movement of capital into dark pools (electronic trading platforms in which 
liquidity that is inaccessible to the public is traded anonymously) since 2007 has 
intensified, unaffected by the GEC. By the end of 2006 in the US, dark pools had 
obtained a 10% market share in equity trading (Degryse, van Achter & Wuyts 2008, 
4); by May 2009 the market share of the single largest equity-trading venue, the 
NASDAQ exchange, had fallen to 20% whereas the market share of dark pools had 
risen to 24% (Brown, 2009). Irrespective of the GEC therefore, the concentration 
of capital in unregulated exchanges increased substantially. In the EU in 2010 
for instance, whereas 49% of equities, 5% of fixed-income securities and 20% 
of derivatives were traded in regulated markets, the figures for OTC trades and 
dark pools were 41%, 89% and 80% respectively. In addition, the proliferation of 
automatic trading programmes means that in official and unofficial exchanges 
alike, an estimated 73% of the total trading volume on U.S. stock markets (Dodd 
2010, 27) is now dominated by High-Frequency Trading.
These ‘cyber-spatial fixes’ would be unsustainable, however, without the 
supporting network of legal, juridical and political power structures that accompanied 
the transformation and growth of this massive flow of hybrid types of capital. When 
(for instance) complex, hybrid financial derivative products began to emerge in the 
1970s they represented one precursor on a complex evolutionary path defined by 
the relationship between the political sector, the financial sector, the legal system 
and academia. Derivatives were nothing new – but they were greatly empowered 
as forms of capital both by the new spaces and forms of complexity enabled by 
the ICT revolution and by the increasing intimacy of their socio-political support 
networks. This evolutionary path and the new spaces and flows of global capital to 
which it gave rise have not been just the product of new financial technologies and 
geopolitical circumstance, therefore. New financial technologies (see Anderloni, 
Llewellyn & Schmidt 2009 for analyses of some new types) have certainly 
accelerated the development of this form of ultracapital, but it also constitutes a 
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coalescence of new, hybrid forms of economic, social and political capital, feeding 
on “turbulence engendered by connectedness”, producing and reproducing “the 
universal transmutability of fluctuation” (Cooper 2010, 179).
Components of ultracapital have therefore been increasingly operationalized 
through fluctuation and turbulence and the removal of spatio-temporal limitations 
permitted by ICT, through the highly complex socio-political relational spaces that 
have developed symbiotically within the financial services sector and through the 
reworking of existing geo-political divisions. Offshore financial centres (OFCs) for 
example that are strategically linked to formal financial centres such as London 
and New York have evolved from small post-colonial offshore banking centres to 
critical portals for the cyber-conversion of capital, another key process. OFCs have 
developed substantial sophistication in both function and type as the needs of 
global capital have expanded; different OFCs form different niche functions for 
the global financial sectors (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti 2010). Bermuda for instance is 
an important location for insurance flows of various kinds, whereas the Cayman 
Islands are pivotal in the structuring and organization of the hedge fund industry. 
Furthermore, the functions undertaken in OFCs are increasingly dominated 
by intra-firm networks of multi-national financial services providers - nominally 
independent national jurisdictions have been absorbed into intra-firm financial 
services provision mechanisms. Increasingly, these networks have also been used 
for the production and mobility of sophisticated structured investment vehicles 
(SIVs) and special purpose vehicles (SPVs), financial services entities whose 
purpose is invisibility, mobility and the concealment of ownership, particularly during 
the securitization boom of 2003–2007. Such entities increased the possibilities 
inherent in the cyber-space available for the invention of capital, whilst at the same 
time these ‘unmanned’ vehicles constitute ultra-capital actants: “the SPV is robotic 
in the sense that no one works there and there is no physical location for the SPV” 
(Gorton 2009, 24). 
As a consequence of their increasing specialization OFCs and their absorption 
into politico-financial networks, they play a vital role globally in helping to speed up 
the flow of capital so that mobility and connectivity themselves can be employed as 
new forms of capital (Cooper 2010). Through these cyber-portals capital becomes 
the location for investment across multiple spatial and temporal scales – self-
propagating capital which can only exist through the development and systemic 
incorporation of new forms of cyber-space:
The real abstraction of contemporary capitalist relations is not dialectic in nature (if it 
ever was) but rather topological. Its world is one of absolute spacetime compression, 
in which metric distances are abolished in favour of sensitivities at a distance and 
collapsible horizons (Cooper 2010, 179).
Substantial quantities of the ‘capital’ thus used is involved in round-tripping, 
for instance, the manipulation of capital by large corporations to constantly alter 
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revenue bases and earnings benchmarks to present different fiscal and tax profiles 
according to need, another illusion helping to render firm accounts mere chimaeras. 
Turning from cyber-space, transnational corporate actants are rapidly developing 
ways to capitalize aspects of their internal social space through innovative financial 
models used to turn intangible assets into capital assets – the economy of the 
United States “is now largely driven by intangible assets” (Jarboe & Furrow 2008, 
v). What constitutes an intangible asset is virtually limitless: “worker skills and 
know-how, innovative work organizations, business methods, brands”, for instance, 
but at the more esoteric level companies are developing new tools to capitalize 
“collective corporate knowledge, individual employee skills… organizational culture” 
and ‘uncodified human and organizational capital.’ Intangible assets are blandly 
described as “a claim to future benefits that does not have physical or financial (a 
stock or a bond) embodiment” (Lev 2001, 5), or “non-physical sources of expected 
benefits” (Zambon et al. 2003, 18), but what is effectively implied is an a priori title of 
ownership over internal ways of thinking, knowing and doing that asserts ownership 
over all possible future uses – a blanket claim to any commercialized processes, 
structures and activities derived from the capitalization (or cannibalization) of all 
internal corporate space, operationalized globally.
At the same time that corporations seek to capitalize all of their own internal 
spaces and processes, they increasingly seek to internalize bio-space for the 
purposes of capitalization. Currently, at the microscopic end of the scale, short-
sequence (15mer-length animal patents) gene patents cover the whole of the 
human genome and, if all such patent claims are allowed, “one company owns 
the rights to 84 per cent of all human genes for a patent they received for cow 
breeding (Rosenfeld & Mason 2013, 1).” At the systemic end of the scale the world’s 
ecosystems are being converted into capital assets (Daily et al. 2000, 395) through 
their semantic translation into ecosystem providers; in the Corporate Ecosystem 
Services Review (Hanson et al. 2012), a coral reef is an erosion control/regulation 
service provider, an earthworm is a soil quality maintenance service provider and 
algae are primary production support service providers. Thus, at the same time 
that the juxtaposition of unlimited space for capitalization and temporal micro-
distanciation “have allowed the financial order to achieve a degree of autonomy from 
“real production” unmatched in the annals of modern political economy (Comaroff 
& Comaroff 2002, 784)”, what is referred to as the information, intangibles, and 
innovation (I3 or I³) economy (Jarboe & Furrow 2008) remorselessly colonizes all 
biological space.
The opening up of relational spaces by the ICT revolution, the complex networks 
that inhabit them and the increasingly different forms of capital they engender 
have shattered the limitations of pre-derivative, pre-cyberspace financial services 
technology. In terms of process, ultracapital builds on Bourdieu’s (1983) take on 
social capital as being an analysis of the ways in which power, privilege and capital 
are structured, produced and reproduced; in this case, through the ability to mediate 
power and privilege through exclusionary cyberspace ultracapital is becoming the 
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privileged meta-capital controlling economic, political, social and cultural capital; in 
so controlling the subordinate forms it renders them interchangeable. Nonetheless, 
this is a conceptual step too far in the view of writers who insist that ultimately all 
forms of financialization are related to fixed, tangible capital:
Suffice it to remark that the much vaunted hypermobility of finance and fictitious capital 
exists in a dialectical relation with, among other things, fixed capital investments of both 
the mobile and immobile sort. (Harvey 2001, 28)
Other writers insist that what generates such expectations are ‘social entities, 
processes, organizations and institutions (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, 158).’ Accordingly: 
“We have reached an historical point at which specific identities, or ways of being, 
including ways of knowing and representing, become the most valuable commodity 
forms” (Graham 2001, 232). Graham’s concept of hypercapitalism (1999; 2000) 
also side-steps the structuralisms of Marxism proper and economic functionalism 
to re-consider the concept of value itself and its relations to capital. Such writing 
addresses the ways in which capitalism is moving up to an evolutionarily higher 
stage and that in order to gain a deeper, broader understanding it is necessary to 
use the GEC to re-visit the assertion that capital “is not a thing”, to understand the 
nature and type of changes in capital deriving from different, specific and more 
intensely interconnected forms of social relations (Graham 2002, 227) and in doing 
so to challenge the meanings of trust and of value itself (Bryan & Rafferty 2007). 
III. Ultra-capital Actor-Networks and the ‘Shadow’ meme
A widespread and rapidly-developing meme of the GEC has been the concept of 
‘shadow banks’ and a ‘shadow banking’ system (see Turner 2009; Harvey 2010; 
Bernanke 2010 for examples); shadow banking has become a core concept in the 
mythic language of the GEC, proposing the dialectic of a traditional, transparent 
and regulated financial services sector and an unregulated, opaque counterpart 
invested in new and risky forms of finance. Most official/academic usage of 
shadow banking avoids definition and tends to repeat the term as if dealing with 
an accepted usage - where definition is attempted, the problem of use immediately 
becomes apparent. Shadow banking constitutes variously: “financial entities other 
than regulated depository institutions (commercial banks, thrifts, and credit unions) 
that serve as intermediaries to channel savings into investment (Bernanke 2010)”; 
“bank-like financial activities that are conducted outside the traditional commercial 
banking system, many of which are unregulated or lightly regulated (FCIC 2010, 
4)”; “non-banking institutions that include (among others) hedge funds, money 
market funds, pension funds, insurance companies and to some extent the large 
custodians such as BoNY and State Street” (Singh & Aitken 2010, 6).
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This concept of an ill-defined, unregulated and (prior to 2007) unrecognised 
region of the financial services sector allegedly became the principal agent of 
blame for global losses estimated by April 2010 at some $2.2–2.3 trillion (IMF 
2010). Included in the discursive take on shadow banking are a number of implicit 
and explicit assumptions, the critical ones being that it was possible to make a 
clear distinction between traditional and shadow banking; that the traditional sector 
was regulated, whereas the shadow sector was unregulated; that the activities of 
the unregulated ‘unsafe’ shadow sector caused the crisis, not the regulated, ‘safe’ 
activities of the traditional sector and that the traditional sector was backstopped by 
regulatory authorities and the shadow sector was not backstopped. 
Examining the record of financial services development since 1970 and that of 
events from 2007 onwards however shows that these assumptions are unjustifiable. 
In terms of any distinction between a safe traditional sector and an unsafe shadow 
sector to begin with, US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) records 
demonstrate how the first mortgage-backed securities were a creation of agencies 
of the US government and that from the earliest securities innovations during the 
1970s, commercial (i.e. FDIC-insured, federally-backstopped) banks: 
Assumed leading roles in providing some of the newer types of financial services 
products, such as credit card securitizations and mortgage banking services….. banks 
remain integral not only in terms of funding these loans but also as active participants 
in the newer types of financial market activities (FDIC 2004). 
The ‘shadow’ activities de facto evolved and were inseparable from the ‘traditional’ 
in a co-constitutive environment. By the 1990s certainly the increasingly intense 
interrelationships of banking activities globally meant that any distinction between 
them had disappeared (Iwaisako 2010, 348) and that they had become inextricably 
linked (Farhi & Cintra 2009). Analysis dealing with shadow banks is therefore 
frequently forced to confront its’ function as a simulacrum: “Their omnipresence–
through arbitrage, innovation and gains from specialization–is a standard feature of 
all advanced financial systems (Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft & Boesky 2010, 7).” 
The mode of development and the ubiquity of the complex of behaviours and 
practices designated ‘shadow’ has meant that backstopping the whole complex of 
financial services was essential to systemic survival during the GEC and that the 
resultant ‘processes and practices of crisis management’ (Jessop 2013, 72) have 
helped to intensify the process of systemic concentration. Since 2007 a global array 
of initiatives has been put in place to prevent a feared collapse of the entire financial 
system, with no distinction being made between shadow and traditional activities. 
In the US, a set of rescue programmes including the Commercial Paper Funding 
Facility, the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility, the Term Securities Lending Facility, 
the Term Auction Facility, the Primary Dealer Credit Facility and the Temporary 
Liquidity Guarantee Program have provided ‘360 degree’ coverage (Pozsar, 
Adrian, Ashcraft & Boesky 2010, 64) to all financial services activities, and the 
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same ‘rescue’ process has resulted in fewer, larger banks absorbing the weakest. 
In Europe financial systems have been shored up against the consequences of the 
GEC by the European Financial Stability Facility, whereas expenditure in the UK 
on various measures totalled £1.2 trillion as of March 2009, some 80% of UK GDP. 
A critical result of the GEC therefore has been a post hoc global regulatory 
recognition of the status quo ante - the complex financial services sector has been 
openly and officially as opposed to implicitly backstopped as a whole, on a global 
basis. Institutionalization and official acceptance of those processes, institutions 
and capital forms deemed latterly to constitute a ‘shadow’ meant that any and all 
regulation and insurance of the financial services sector axiomatically includes 
them. As a result, financial service institutions that have so far survived the GEC 
have become massive hybrids that undertake all of the activities from before the 
GEC. These are effectively ‘universal banks’ (Nersisyan & Wray 2010, 10) and in 
the USA by 2010 the top 4 controlled 40% of total banking assets. FDIC figures for 
2010 show that these top four banks controlled 88% of US derivative holdings and 
78% of bad mortgages, whilst at the same time they held 42% of uninsured bank 
deposits and 42% of insured bank deposits. 
But the critical feature of global financial services (for the purposes of outlining 
ultracapital at least) is not their size, but their interconnectivity. In terms of providing 
a skeleton of global financial services, Vitali et al. (2011) have used available data on 
ownership and connections between global transnational corporations to build an 
“architecture of the international ownership network” (2011, 1, see Figure 1 below). 
Vitali et al. map the connectivity of 1318 transnational corporations comprising the 
core that owns 80% of all global revenues from among all of the 43,000 registered 
transnational corporations (TNCs); amongst this core, however, there is a ‘Super-
entity’ of 147 interconnected TNCs that controls 40% of revenues of the core. The 
practical implications of this geo-politically are vast: “In detail, nearly 4/10 of the 
control over the economic value of TNCs in the world is held, via a complicated 
web of ownership relations, by a group of 147 TNCs in the core” (2011, 4).
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Figure 1: Network Topology of Strongly Connected Core Components (SCCs)
Key: Red = Superconnected companies, Yellow = very connected companies, Size of dot represents 
revenue (Source: Vitali et al. 2011)
The evolutionary pathology of the GEC has been pre-determined, not by a 
Manichaean struggle between shadow and traditional activities, but by this core of 
highly-connected TNCs and by the complex of fluid and often-unstable relationships 
between them. As a result of the enhanced accumulation to be achieved from 
these highly-connected new actor networks and the cyber-spaces they enabled, 
the dominance of industrial/production capital (Harvey, 2010:40) in the post-war 
period was rapidly overturned; whereas in the early 1980s the manufacturing 
sector’s profits accounted for 40% of total US profits (Faber 2005, 11), by 2005 44% 
of all corporate profits came from the financial sector (Dalio & Srivastava 2004, 
1). Not only that, but as this socio-politico-financial hybrid increasingly diverted 
investment from the ‘real’ economy in the US, the massive increase in financial 
services profitability had virtually no effect on fixed capital formation:
Figure 2: Notional amount of derivatives and US gross fixed capital formation, 2000–2008.
Source: Posen & Hinterschweiger 2009.
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The 1980s also witnessed a rapid melding of the mechanisms supposed to impart 
market discipline. Changes in the business models of credit ratings agencies meant 
competing to sell their rating services to the investment banks, at the same time 
that the major accountants were also being forced to sell themselves as firms went 
‘opinion shopping’ (Magill & Previts 1991, 124) for the ‘best’ audit. Concentration 
within credit rating and accountancy sectors intensified interrelationships between 
firms, raters and accountants, at the same time that the growing profitability of 
management consultancy gave accountants a vested interest in providing strategic 
managerial advice to firms that they also audited. This concentration went 
accompanied by an increasing concentration in the banking sector; between 1934 
and 1985 the number of commercial banks in the US had remained steady at about 
14,000, whereas by 2010 this had decreased by half to about 7,000 (Nersisyan & 
Wray 2010, 10).
For political parties throughout liberal western democracies in the post-Soviet 
era particularly, ideological difference was rapidly subsumed by the pressure 
to demonstrate superior ability as a manager of an increasingly interconnected 
globalising capitalist economy. The financial services sector and party political 
systems throughout western liberal democracies became so intertwined that they 
were effectively contiguous areas of the same system in relational space:
The legal-organizational entity of the corporation and the network of institutions and 
organs that make up government are part and parcel of the same encompassing 
mode of power. We call this mode of power the state of capital, and it is the ongoing 
transformation of this state of capital that constitutes the accumulation of capital (Nitzan 
and Bichler 2009, 8).
In practical terms expressions of the dissipation and delegation of state 
responsibilities were multifarious. These included the drive to free movement of 
capital across borders, hemisphere-wide movements towards the abandonment of 
Depression-era regulation, substantial increases in the amount of leverage (debt 
per unit of concrete asset) allowed to investment banks and powers to measure 
their own internal risk, a rapid movement towards light or self-regulation by stock 
exchange supervisory bodies and the outdating of and failure to replace regulations 
to keep place with financial innovations. In respect of governance, the absorption 
of the states has therefore had the additional effect of undermining the dominant 
discourse of democracy as “a set of procedures, institutions, and laws designed 
to connect the person as individual and citizen to the political processes of nation-
state governance.” The reality is rather that with the rise of ultracapital “globally 
defined systems of circulation and production are altering the conditions of people’s 
freedom in deeply structural ways that are beyond the reach of recognition or 
regulation” (Lipuma & Koelble 2004, 102, 104).
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IV. European Actor-Networks and the Language of Crisis
In continuing the mythic language of crisis description outlined above and presenting 
a neoliberal portrayal of capitalism in operation, where Europe is concerned official 
discourse has metamorphosed from the creation of ‘shadow banking’ to presenting 
critical events in Europe in the form of a European ‘debt crisis’. This crisis has 
necessitated the implementation of ‘austerity’ programmes to rescue, particularly 
the southern periphery of the EC, but Europe more generally, from the profligacy 
of their social spending programmes. In pursuit of this discourse a range of linear, 
temporal timelines have been presented purporting to describe this debt crisis, 
many centring on the role of Greece as a trigger (those of the UK Guardian and the 
BBC present interesting examples).2 That of the European Central Bank (ECB) is 
more detailed and it begins in December 2005 with a set of press releases in which 
the ECB appeared to warn of problems ahead.3
Actions taken by the European Union (EU), the ECB and various national 
governments and their private sector partners since 2007 have been exclusively 
guided by this linear, temporal focus, initiatives ostensibly to address systemic 
flaws but from a very limited understanding of that system. As the Institute of 
International and European Affairs shows,4 these have included Eurozone national 
bailouts, closer monitoring of sovereign debt maturity and national budgets, ECB 
interest rate and bond interventions, bank stress tests, new EU rules on financial 
institution practices, new financial supervision structures (the ESRB), re-vamping 
of the stability and growth pact, EU 2020 reforms, Euro Plus Pact of 2011, the Single 
Market Acts 1 and 2 and the Fiscal Compact. The culmination of this sequence of 
widening and deepening reactions to an intensifying succession of events within 
the EU has been the proposal of Open Market Transactions by Mr Draghi, the 
“most successful monetary policy measure undertaken in recent times”;5 this 
means that where the ECB suspects that the bonds of an EU country engaged 
in fiscal measures with the ECB are the subject of speculation, it will quite literally 
buy unlimited amounts of them, guaranteeing losses for speculators. But as Bruff & 
Horn (2012) point out, what is going on is undoubtedly general and systemic:
One of the most striking aspects of the post-2007 literature on varieties of capitalism has 
been the near-total lack of reflection on the implications of the crisis for the frameworks 
being employed and the assumptions they are based upon (2012, 162).
2 <www.guardian.co.uk/business/interactive/2012/oct/17/eurozone-crisis-interactive-timeline-
three-years> (accessed 29/10/13).
3 <www.ecb.int/ecb/html/crisis.en.html> (accessed 29/10/13).
4 <www.iiea.com/eview?gclid=CPuzvNCYu7gCFTMctAod-EUAIA> (accessed 29/10/13).
5 Mario Draghi, quoted in the Financial Times 22/7/13. Available at <www.ft.com/cms/
s/0/2597e96c-f2d9-11e2-a203-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2ZxVhkwe7> (accessed 29/10/13).
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The evolutionary processes of ultracapital have been intensifying rapidly 
during the early 2000s, in Europe as elsewhere. Their increased melding of the 
state/private hybrid, in this case through the over-arching mechanisms of the EU, 
the ECB, the Commission and the European parliament has been a ceaseless 
generator of “new spaces and space relations” which has rapidly accelerated the 
pace of “capitalism’s… increasingly self-produced geography” (Harvey, 2010: 144). 
As Jones (2009: 6) asserts in another context, this set of “conditions of economic 
circulation, hypermobility, timespace compression, and cultural insignia warrant a 
completely new conceptualization of space.”
The set of events since 2007 in Europe is not amenable to functionalist or 
institutionalist descriptions without an understanding the intensification of network 
connectivity and, beyond that, the complexity of systemic evolutionary forces at play. 
Some recent research has begun to map the importance of this interconnectivity 
in what are termed TBTF (Too-Big-To-Fail, sometimes referred to as TITF, Too-
Important-To-Fail) institutions (see Ötker-Robe et al. 2011), including belated 
recognition by supranational financial institutions such as the Bank of International 
Settlements of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), but there is as 
yet little understanding of the systemic environment within which they operate, what 
kind of system they might represent and the socio-historical processes that led to 
the development of these SIFIs.
Europe has (for instance) been undergoing a rapid intensification of its financial 
services sector that has accompanied EU expansion and a dramatic decline in 
the actual number of institutions at the same time as the largest have grown in 
importance. Between 1997 and 2005 the total number of such institutions decreased 
from 4,228 to 2,683 (Uhde & Heimeshoff 2009; see also Fig. 3) at the same time 
that the total credit assets controlled by the 5 biggest institutions increased between 
1980–1999 from 27.9% to 57.1% (Santillán Salgado 2011, cited in Roos 2013).
Figure 3: Decline in the number of European Financial Institutions 1999–2007. Source: 
Development of the euro area monetary financial institutions sector, ECB Press Release, 3 
January 2007.
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Whilst this process of intensification has been taking place, total assets 
controlled by the largest institutions have continued to increase, giving them more 
and more power, socially and politically as well as economically and financially. 
Figure 4 shows the dramatic increase in the assets to GDP ratio of the top three 
banks in 7 European countries by comparison with Japan and the US, from 1990 
onwards:
Figure 4: Aggregate assets to GDP of top three banks in selected countries (%). Source: 
Goldstein & Verόn, © voxEU.org6
Neither has this been a purely commercial process; since 2007 the governments 
of the EU have been reluctant to let any financial institutions fail – the cases 
of the rescue of IKB by the German government and of Northern Rock by the 
UK government are just two examples. Such rescues have been facilitated and 
operationalized by because the increasing intimacy between the financial services 
sector and the political sector across Europe, which has given rise to what amounts 
to a politico-financial interchangeability, not to say interdependence. The roles 
played by ex-Goldman Sachs advisors Mario Draghi and Mario Monti in the Italian 
Central bank, the Italian presidency and the ECB, as well as the roles of Lucas 
Papademos and Petros Christodolou in the government of Greece (amongst a host 
of others) gives ample evidence of this. The complex involvement of significant 
sectors of the Spanish and French political establishments in the network of non-
commercial banks, savings banks and mutual represent culturally differentiated 
examples of the same processes in action
Prior to the crisis the implicit backstopping and political support enjoyed by 
national and pan-European financial institutions enabled the accruing of significant 
advantages within Europe on a core-periphery basis (banks in the UK, France, 
6 <www.voxeu.org/article/eu-should-start-debate-too-big-fail> (accessed 29/10/13).
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Germany and the Netherlands enjoying significant advantages to those in Portugal 
and Greece as a result of the relative power and wealth of respective governments. 
Figure 5 shows the significant increase in increasing their assets as a percentage 
of country-of-origin GDP:
Fig. 5: Bank assets as % of domestic GDP. Source: Bankscope and WEO Databases cited by 
Ötker-Robe.7
Despite these footprints of the evolutionary development of the European 
component of ultracapital as a complex, dynamic system and the belated 
recognition that there are at the least financial nodes, actants within this complex 
that can bring down regional or hemispheric economies, the growth in strength 
of these financial networks continues apace, facilitated by the politico-financial 
networks co-constituted with them. As a compliment and contingent to Figure 1 
above (produced separately and using different measures to instrumentalize the 
view) Ötker-Robe et al. (2011) have mapped the connectivity of financial services 
globally, deploying the complex derivative commitments between financial services 
actants to produce a topology of connectivity:  
7 <blogs.worldbank.org/allaboutfinance/addressing-the-too-big-to-fail-problem-before-the-
banks-become-too-big-to-save> (accessed 29/10/13).
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Fig. 6: Financial Institutional connectivity – European/Global. Source: Ötker-Robe et al. 
(2011).
Although conceived as a way of mapping the contagion effects on the part of 
any of the actants in this network (and in passing pointing out that no member of 
the central tier can be allowed to fail without catastrophic effects hemispherically 
and indeed globally), both topologies have important things to say about the role 
of transnational actants which has only recently become a focus of writing on the 
GEC. Roos (2013) for example points to an absence in political economy literature 
on the role and place of transnational actors, and in the geographical and political 
science literature on democratic structures and power. Such critiques have raised 
the question of why capitalism itself is not in the picture: “Our view is that capitalism 
itself is not discussed, to the extent that it is the elephant in the room housing these 
debates” (Bruff 2011).
Finally, in considering the topology of connectivity above it is useful to revisit 
the characteristics of Actor-Network Theory that Latour describes, to underpin their 
relevance to re-visiting capital as a form of social relations. Firstly, in terms of “the 
tyranny of distance” (2005, 3), financial actor-networks can as we see be truly 
global in scale, whilst at the same time linking the “irreducible, incommensurable, 
unconnected localities” of institutions, groups, individuals; they can also be 
networks of long standing or instantaneous networks constructed for the sake of 
one deal, conducted entirely in cyber-space between servers. Secondly, in terms of 
scale and dissolving micro-, macro-distinctions, a single network act between two 
individuals can be of a scale to affect millions of people (assembling and approving a 
derivative model, for instance), entire cities or entire regions, whereas the quotidian 
transactions of millions of people (ATM transactions, say) may affect little outside 
their immediate environment; in this respect, studying the network connections 
in which acts take place is far more important: “A network is never bigger than 
another one, it is simply longer or more intensely connected” (2005, 4). Lastly, in 
terms of inside/outside, what is important in examining ultracapital actor networks 
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is how they are connected; boundaries, particularly national and political ones, are 
still relevant but they are absorbed into the geography of financial services actor-
networks to become part of the functionality of the whole (capital mobility that 
deploys different tax regimes within Europe and in the Caribbean as mechanisms 
for increasing profits, for example), this is therefore very much a geography of 
connectivity, of associations.
V. AFTERWORD
The set of events presented by the US Federal Reserve and the serried ranks of 
political and economic commentators globally as US financial crisis changed its’ 
name to the global economic crisis on August 6, 2007 (Iwaisako 2010, 353), when 
PNB Paribas had to suspend three of its hedge funds because “it had become 
impossible to calculate the net asset value of the funds (Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap 
& Shin 2008).” These initially localized consequences of a set of critical processes 
that had never been restricted to the US passed over to Europe through networks 
and as a consequence of the concealed functions of actors and actants that have 
been left out of the phenomenological characterization of crisis that is presented 
daily by governments, institutions and media. None of the timelines devised to 
represent a ‘Euro-crisis’, a sovereign debt crisis or a global financial crisis and thus, 
post hoc, determine causation in fact do any such thing.
As a counterpart to the official discourse of disaster, of December 2012 the 
total notional value of all outstanding over-the-counter derivative contracts globally 
was more than $632 trillion, up from about $596 trillion in December 2007. This 
represents, not just a vast increase in capital flows of obscure provenance and 
ownership which are effectively invisible to regulatory structures and mechanisms, 
‘monetized relations of the relations of capital’ (LiPuma and Lee, 2004: 86), but 
their concentration in the hands of fewer and fewer super-entities. Fundamental 
change in financial services structures has been occasioned by the opening up of 
ultracapital space by ‘socially imaginary objects’ (LiPuma & Lee 2005, 407) which 
are beyond purely technical control and which are enabled by hybrid politico-
financial networks that are still firmly in place. The invention and development, not 
just of new forms of capital but of ways in which they could or should be measured 
(as well as where and when) had by the eve of the GEC, for official purposes 
“arguably undermined the essential character of regulatory capital” (FSA 2007, 9).
ICT-intensified politico-financial flows and processes have led to the creation 
of an increasing range of distinctively new forms of capital which, despite a 
symbolic dollar value reflecting the power of their creator, cannot be quantified or 
measured in a meaningful fashion and which remain themselves unknown and 
incomprehensible to all but a small group of elite actors. A range of critical academic 
analyses prior to the GEC had already begun to outline the implications of some 
of these capital forms for the representation of money, for the fundamental idea of 
Cloke
117
value (see Bryan & Rafferty 2007; LiPuma & Lee 2004) but also for the irrelevance 
of material measurements of capital – the analysis presented above focuses on 
these processes as the truly critical events. The ICT revolution in combination with 
an increasingly undifferentiated state-capital nexus have added “neoliberalism’s 
apparently limitless virtual space, and (…) a rate of computer driven acceleration 
that is constrained only by the level of technological innovation at any given time” 
(Hassan 2011, 394) to the previously nebulous development of capital; it is a hidden 
revolution constituting an increasingly vital component of a series of invisible, silent 
crises. 
Not despite, but because of the set of the set of events described as economic 
crises which they themselves have precipitated, the intimate interrelationships 
between regulatory bodies, financial services actants, the state, academia and the 
complex, global cyber-service mechanisms of the OFCs - the essential components 
of ultracapital - remain not just intact but strengthened by the events since 2007. 
Loud public pronunciations of the need to ‘properly regulate the banks’ aside in 
Europe, the UK and the USA, the innovatory cyber-mechanisms that propelled 
the current ‘Euro-crisis’ remain essentially untouched and the drive to create new 
capital, increasingly detached from GDP/productivity processes, immeasurable, 
unregulated but ultimately legal, continues apace. The net result is that: “We cannot 
identify the likely sources of future stress to the system, and act pre-emptively to 
diffuse them” (Geithner 2007).
The extended set of critical events in Europe and globally over the previous four 
decades is constituted by the relationship between new forms of capital, its pre-ICT 
forms and the actor-networks that enabled them and which have been increasingly 
empowered by them. Distinctive but interrelated and inseparable phenomena 
can be outlined; the detachment of new forms of capital from observable GDP 
processes; the development of limitless cyber-spaces to assist in the creation and 
instantaneous trading of self-producing capital juxtaposed to the technical ability 
to utilize increasingly smaller fractions of time; the socio-political and jurisdictional 
mechanisms created by the cyber-portals of OFCs, and the development of 
immeasurable and unidentifiable capital. These new forms range from suggesting 
that environmental sustainability can only be achieved through ‘running ‘Earth 
Incorporated’ with a depreciation, amortization and maintenance account’ (Strong 
1996), to ‘capital investment in bioinformatics at the scale of molecular biology’ 
(Sullivan 2013, 211) - capitalization processes are claiming ownership over future 
ways of knowing and changing humanity, the effective privatization of evolution. 
A suggested outline of ultracapital forms has been touched on in this paper; 
ICT-dependent capital evolved through the use of academic and socio-political 
networks such as political parties, research institutions and university departments. 
There is also capital constructed to conceal value, ownership and location, through 
velocity of circulation and complex intermediation - not just derivatives, but the 
offshore Special Purpose Vehicles through which they move and the concealed 
political, accountancy and inter-firm alliances that enable them. The discussion 
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touches on capital developed through political, regulatory and accountancy 
capture designed to be concealed from objective valuation, regulation and 
taxation; ultracapital effectively utilizes the new kinds of social capital enabled by 
the erosion of difference at the state/private regulatory interface into a contiguous 
politico-financial relational space. It is capital that is a synthesis of social capital, 
technology and socio-politics on a global scale, whose financial and economic 
capital artefacts are crafted by intricate, complex and co-constitutive relationships 
between regulatory, political and cyber-actants.
The landscape thus created by ultracapital for ‘its own functioning’ (Harvey 
2001) is self-propagating and appears from the evidence of the global economic 
crisis to have all but freed itself from the gravity of the ‘real’ political economy. 
The over-accumulation thus achieved is not related to surpluses of labour and the 
capital which stimulates it can be created, moved or abandoned at will without the 
constraint of regulation or legal jurisdiction. It retains aspects of Harvey’s Hegelian 
expansion in terms of both an inner dialectic of crisis formation leading to over-
accumulation in space related to an outer dialectic of geographical spatial release 
of these surpluses; through the ability to create both new spaces and subsequently 
new capital out of the cyber-ether, however, it transcends these dialectics. To follow 
Baudrillard (2006), in drawing strength from the global economic crisis ultracapital is 
close to bearing ‘no relation to any reality whatever: it is its own pure simulacrum.’ In 
this respect labels such as global economic/financial/liquidity crisis are misnomers 
– the years since 2007 may well have been the birth cry of a dramatically new form 
of capitalism.
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